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After Federalist No. 10
Greg Weiner
Feder alist  No.  10  may be the most debated of all the Federalist Papers, and its winding odyssey through American historiography 
has indelibly shaped interpretations of it. The essay was not regarded 
as one of the important numbers of the Federalist Papers until Charles 
Beard made it the central exhibit in his 1913 indictment of the framers 
for possessive individualism, setting off a century-long conservative de-
fense of its author, James Madison, against the progressive historian’s 
lèse-majesté. But there was a significant sense in which Beard’s premise 
about the essay, if not his conclusion from it, was correct: Madison was 
concerned with the integrity of property and how majorities could be 
habituated to respect it, and the extended-republic theory of Federalist 
No. 10 — which appears in the great framer’s correspondence repeatedly 
leading up to the Philadelphia Convention and after it — was most cer-
tainly central to his constitutional theory. Where Beard erred was in his 
reflexive equation of property rights with naked greed.
Even more broadly than property rights, Federalist No. 10 pertains 
to the orientation of personal appetites toward public ends, which in-
clude both the common good and private rights. The essay recognizes 
that these appetites cannot be conquered, but they can be conditioned. 
Madison’s solution to the problem of faction — a solution he confines to 
the four corners of majority rule — is to place majorities in circumstances 
that encourage deliberation and thus defuse passion. Significantly, this 
solution does not depend on any specific constitutional mechanism: 
When he announces at the end of the essay that he has “remed[ied]” the 
“disease” of faction, Madison has not mentioned a single facet of the 
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proposed Constitution — neither the judiciary nor bicameralism nor 
the president’s veto. Any republic deployed across an extended territory 
should be relatively free of faction, at least in the aggregate.
Yet Madison’s solution depends on certain assumptions. Federalist 
No. 10 assumes politics will occur at a leisurely pace. The regime 
Madison foresees is relatively passive, not an active manipulator of eco-
nomic arrangements. And he is able to take for granted a reasonably 
broad consensus as to the existence if not the content of the public good. 
These assumptions are now collapsing under the weight of positive 
government and the velocity of our political life. Given the centrality 
of Federalist No. 10 to the American constitutional canon, this collapse 
demands a reckoning. If a pillar of our order is crumbling, something 
must replace it. The alternative to outsized appetites is self-control; the 
political mechanisms that channel passions are set against the moral 
mechanisms that restrain them. If the assumptions of Federalist No. 
10 no longer obtain, it seems necessary to supply the defect with some-
thing on which Madison was loath to rely. That challenge may call for 
a greater emphasis on the sources of civic virtue and on the means of 
sustaining it.
MadisoN’s  assuMptioNs
The possibility that virtue might be coded into the essay is evident at 
its most elemental level: Federalist No. 10’s definition of a faction as 
a group “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, 
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the perma-
nent and aggregate interests of the community.” As George Carey 
noted, this definition hinges on an objective understanding of the 
public good; one cannot comprehend Madison from the perspective of 
contemporary relativism. 
From the outset, then, Federalist No. 10 makes a demand — a thin 
one, thus far, but still a demand — in the coin of virtue: Its reader must 
be committed to a normative concept of the good and occupy a polity in 
which it is possible for such a concept to be broadly shared. This concept 
is thin insofar as the demand to this point does not speak to the con-
tent of that good, only to its objective existence. As Carey has written, 
“[T]hose who do not believe in an objective moral order cannot ‘enter’ 
Madison’s system.” Thus, belief in such an order, even amid disputes as 
to its content, constitutes a first unstated assumption of Federalist No. 10.
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Having thus defined factions, the essay proceeds to the crisply binary 
mode of analysis for which it is famous. Madison presents a series of 
choices, repeatedly eliminating one, then bifurcating the other in turn, 
and eliminating again until he arrives at his solution. One can remove the 
causes of factions or control their effects. The causes cannot be removed 
because the propensity to disagree is “sown in the nature of man,” arising 
particularly from the fact that man is “fallible” and his “opinions and his 
passions . . . have a reciprocal influence on each other.” Precisely because 
this influence arises from the link between “reason” and “self-love,” the lat-
ter of which distorts the former, property accounts for “the most common 
and durable source of factions,” the key being its durability. 
Whereas David Hume’s analysis of parties said that those based on 
self-interest were the most excusable while those based on passions were 
the most dangerous, Madison warns of the reverse. Those rooted in 
emotion — including “an attachment to different leaders ambitiously con-
tending for pre-eminence and power” — are the least worrisome precisely 
because they are based on passions, which Madison believes to be tran-
sient. By contrast, factions based on meaningful skin in the game — that 
is, property — endure. A second assumption of Federalist No. 10 is conse-
quently that irrational passions, which Madison understands to be those 
not based on interest, are inherently unsustainable and thus are natu-
rally fleeting. The demagogic leader whose sole or even primary appeal is 
rooted in personality rather than some tangible benefit he delivers to the 
people will be unable to sustain his popularity.
Narrowing his options for solving the problem of faction, Madison 
next distinguishes between majority and minority groups, brushing the 
latter off in two sparse sentences. 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sin-
ister views, by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may 
convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its 
violence under the forms of the Constitution.
From this dismissal, we can mine the assumption that the government 
Madison anticipates will not be actively involved in distributing small 
economic advantages to vocal minorities (be they interest groups or 
industries). The reason is that the “republican principle” cannot operate 
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to control minority groups in a regime that traffics in such subsidies. 
As Madison has just explained it, this principle assumes direct conflict 
between majorities and minorities that is susceptible to ultimately ir-
resistible majoritarian influence. 
The distribution of small economic advantages by a positive state 
dissolves that assumption by making it less expensive for each taxpayer 
to finance his minimal share of a given subsidy than it would be to orga-
nize the majority to resist it. An extensive territory actively undermines 
the incentive for conflict by further concentrating benefits and diffusing 
costs. Madison, of course, did not know Mancur Olson, who recog-
nized that majorities would not form to resist subsidies under those 
conditions. It is Madison’s emphasis on the “great desideratum” of a 
government that would be impartial between competing interests that 
supplies the best evidence for his assumption that the regime will not 
involve itself in economic minutiae.
Having dismissed minority factions, Madison turns his attention to 
abusive majorities. He aims, first, to impede their formation with the 
size of the republic: Because there will be so many people and interests 
in an extended republic, as Federalist No. 51’s restatement of the thesis 
explains, “a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom 
take place upon any other principles than those of justice and the gen-
eral good.” In other words, if a group is impelled by ill motives, the 
intrinsic conditions of an extended republic will make it difficult for it 
to become a majority. 
If such a majority should exist, it will be inhibited by the difficulty of 
communicating across a large territory — one postulate here being the 
diffusion of passions with time — and by the need to communicate its 
views through representatives, a higher quality of whom will be drawn 
from a larger population and who, operating at a proper constitutional 
distance from the immediate influence of the populace, will then “refine 
and enlarge the public views.” A third assumption, then, is that both 
geographic and constitutional distance will permit the passions to dis-
sipate before their translation into policy.
Finally, Madison cautions Jefferson in correspondence about 
a month before Federalist No. 10’s publication that the extended- 
republic theory “can only hold within a sphere of a mean extent. As in 
too small a sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed 
agst. the weaker party; so in too extensive a one, a defensive concert 
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may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted 
with the administration.” While this warning about a “mean extent” 
is not specified in the essay itself, it is an auxiliary of the “republi-
can principle” that we can identify as another latent assumption of 
Federalist No. 10.
To recapitulate, the assumptions are as follows: The people will share 
a belief in the existence of an objective moral order, even if they dispute 
its content; passions, especially when they pertain to attachments or 
aversions to political leaders, will be unsustainable; government will not 
dictate the distribution of small economic advantages; geographic and 
constitutional distance will operate to dissipate passions; and, finally, 
the territory will not be so large that public opinion cannot form.
Like dominos, these assumptions have toppled, one against the other. 
It would not be too much to observe that none of them stands in a form 
that would be recognizable to Madison today.
assuMptioNs uNdoNe
It is almost universally acknowledged that moral relativism is ascendant 
in contemporary American society. It is also ascendant in readings of 
Federalist No. 10. In his Preface to Democratic Theory, Robert Dahl apparently 
thought he was doing Madison a genuine service by substituting social-
scientific definitions for Madisonian terms where it seemed obvious that 
the founder’s would not do. The result mauled Madison’s thought. Having 
circumvented Madison’s system by assessing it from the perspective of 
Weberian scientism — “[a]s to the ‘permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community,’” Dahl wrote, “so far as I am aware no political group has ever 
admitted to being hostile to these” — he was surprised to find it wanting.
But inside the Madisonian system, of course, one need not confess to 
such hostility any more than a criminal must confess to his crime to be 
guilty. Guilt is an objective condition; so is opposition to the public good. 
There will always be dispute as to the public good’s content, but the rejec-
tion of it as an ontological category coarsens public conversation, turning 
all controversies into questions of power and advantage alone.
There are some who read Federalist No. 10 in precisely this way: as a 
proto-pluralist brief that forecasts acquisitive interest groups pursuing their 
appetites and the public good arising from the clashes between them. But 
Madison does not say this. On his account, factions are inherently, defini-
tionally bad and ought to be inhibited. The operation of the republican 
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principle assumes that a public good exists and that a majority, placed in 
conditions favorable to deliberation, will be able to discover a reasonable 
approximation of it.
That is linked with Madison’s second assumption, which is that pas-
sions will be inherently fleeting, especially impassioned attachments to 
leaders that defy either evidence about them or one’s own self-interest. 
In Madison’s psychology, passion is best understood as a force that inter-
venes between the individual and his perception of the evidence reason 
presents to the mind. It distorts, scrambling the signal and preventing 
its reception. It is sudden and intense, but its force is ephemeral.
It would not be surprising on Madison’s analysis if voters were briefly 
enthralled to a political leader such that they were impervious to rea-
soned argument about him, especially with respect to his effect on their 
own interest. It is also possible, of course, that Madison’s psychology 
is simply wrong as an empirical matter, but within the confines of his 
system, the test of his thesis would be whether demagogic leaders today 
are able to sustain impassioned loyalty.
Clearly there is ample room for disagreement as to who precisely 
these leaders might be, but the technology of communication — from 
Twitter to email to the 24 / 7 information environment — provides 
tools for constantly stoking passions while leaving little space for 
them to cool. One has hardly processed one tweet before the next 
arrives. President Trump in particular has proved to be an artist at 
timing these to sustain the enthusiasm of his movement each time it 
appears in danger of waning. Each is greeted almost immediately with 
thousands if not tens of thousands of retweets, and the more emo-
tional — in Madisonian terms, impassioned — the appeal, the stronger 
the response. 
Third, Madison assumed the regime would not involve itself in 
the distribution of small economic advantages. Yet in post-New Deal 
America, this assumption about a relatively uncomplicated regime in 
which majorities and minorities do transparent combat also collapses. 
Despite the occasional gnashing of rhetorical teeth, there are few 
assumptions more broadly accepted in the actual practice of contem-
porary politics than that it is legitimate and even imperative for the 
national government to concern itself with small economic allocations. 
There are, of course, important disputes as to the mechanism of deliv-
ery (for example, the tax code or appropriations). The point is that the 
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accumulated mass of these advantages changes the calculus on which 
Madison relied in flatly assuming that, under the “republican princi-
ple,” minority factions would lose head-to-head battles with majorities. 
Under conditions of positive government, it is far likelier that this com-
bat never occurs because, as students of Olson know, majorities have a 
positive disincentive to show for the fight.
The most casual glimpse at the absurdity of the federal tax code il-
lustrates the point. Any one of its tens of thousands of pages is apt to 
contain a targeted tax break that aspires to incentivize, discourage, or 
otherwise manipulate economic behavior. Each provision individually 
is a single Lilliputian’s string applied to Gulliver: hardly worth the cost 
of resistance. The problem is that the taxpayers do not comprise a single 
body with a single will. If they did, they could decide together to re-
sist the aggregate aggression of Lilliput. The question instead, Olson 
teaches, is whether each of them individually bears enough cost for each 
individual string to justify the cost to each of cutting it. The answer is 
that they do not: The cost of a micromanagerial tax subsidy spread over 
the entire population is unlikely to incur complaints from individual 
taxpayers, not because they regard it as just but rather because resisting 
it costs more than paying their fractional share of its price.
Fourth, Madison had assumed that geographic and constitutional 
distance would also operate to dissipate passions. Yet, as Yuval Levin 
predicted 15 years ago in The Public Interest, the same technological 
dynamics that help to sustain passionate attachments to leaders have 
also consumed the constitutional distance between statesmen and con-
stituents. The webpages of members of Congress now, as a matter of 
course, refer to them by their first names. Members tweet with their 
own thumbs (as does the president). They are expected to respond to 
the public’s views immediately, both in the literal sense that the public 
expects no intermediation — no refining and enlarging of their views, 
only their unmediated translation into policy — and in the temporal 
sense that political figures are expected to do so without delay.
It is little surprise, then, that political campaigns, especially at the 
national level, are increasingly personality-driven. A slogan like “Feel 
the Bern” encapsulates the phenomenon — the Bernie Sanders partisan 
both “feels” his loyalty and gives it to “the Bern,” that is, personally. 
To be sure, there are limits to the conclusions one can draw from slo-
gans: “Feel the Bern” is simply catchier than “Contemplate Democratic 
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Socialism.” Still, the evidence is considerable that the former precedes 
the latter, not the other way around. In other words, partisan affiliation is 
not based on conclusions drawn from objective information, but rather, 
affiliations inherited from a variety of sources — childhood, neighbor-
hood, occupation, identity, and so forth — drive the conclusions. 
For Madison, conclusions drawn from passionate attachments are the 
calling card of faction. The idea that we should attach ourselves to politi-
cal figures and cling to those attachments against what our reason tells us 
or, failing that, what our interests dictate is foreign to his psychological as-
sumptions about the relationship between reason and passion. Again, the 
point is not that Madison’s psychology is impeccable. Nor is it certain that 
we should want feeling altogether banished from the political realm. The 
question, rather, is whether the foundational assumptions of Federalist 
No. 10 can withstand the pressure of contemporary communications tech-
nology. There is reason to believe they cannot.
These same technological dynamics have accelerated the speed of 
communication past the measured pace that Madison thought necessary 
for deliberation. This measured pace is latent in his claim that communi-
cating factious schemes will be more difficult over a large territory. The 
more than 30 published volumes of Madison’s papers, much of it corre-
spondence, attest to the fact that it was not impossible to communicate 
political plans — but it was impossible to communicate them quickly. 
The link between the assumptions is that, in the time required to com-
municate across an extensive territory, passions will naturally dissipate.
Yet even by the end of Madison’s life, communication had begun to 
accelerate. His 1834 memorandum “Majority Governments” is sanguine 
about the prospects for enlarging the union because, due to steam-
boats, railroads, and other improvements, “the facility and quickness 
of intercommunication throughout the Union is greater now than it 
formerly was between the remote parts of the State of Virginia.” In 1791, 
in fact, he had said as much about newspapers in a National Gazette es-
say: Improvements in communication were “equivalent to a contraction 
of territorial limits, and [are] favorable to liberty, where these may be 
too extensive.”
Note the “too extensive.” There is a balance to be struck: 
Communication is useful insofar as it makes the “mean extent” that 
was Madison’s final assumption larger by enabling the formation of a 
“defensive concert” through the cultivation of public consensus against 
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an abusive regime. But on Madison’s account, the returns on rapid com-
munication should diminish beyond this point because there will be no 
space in which passions can calm before impulse and decision converge. 
This, again, is substantially where matters stand today. An idea 
hatched in a remote corner of the country can be instantly spread 
by social media and communicated to elected representatives nearly 
as quickly. This speed, in return, generates expectations at odds with 
constitutionalism. The contemporary condition is a politics of instant 
gratification that regards the political order, Congress especially, as ab-
normally palsied when ordinary constitutional mechanisms slow its 
proceedings to what is a healthy, republican pace.
The “mean extent” is also too large if the population is so extensive that 
it cannot occupy the same general realm of opinion with respect to the 
common good. It is too much to say the United States, sprawling beyond 
a continent, has reached this point. But the electoral map indicates a grow-
ing geographical divide in American politics, one that largely separates the 
coasts from what is derisively called “flyover country.” To call it an urban-
rural divide is to paint with too broad a brush: There are large, conservative 
cities in Texas and small, liberal hamlets in Vermont. The split is deeply 
cultural, but that culture is undeniably correlated with geography; it is a 
divide between the coasts and the center. Whether this polarization is a 
function of the size of the country is questionable, to be sure, but what is 
clear is that there are enough opinions dividing the country that any proj-
ect attempting to form a coherent public will seems doomed.
Madison’s sweet spot for the size of electoral districts may dictate an-
other “mean extent.” Madison argued that one advantage of large districts 
was that they made it impossible to practice the “vicious arts” by which 
elections were often decided. He seems in particular to have meant what 
he regarded as the abominable practice of “treating”: liquoring up the 
public on the eve of a vote. (His stubborn refusal to do so cost Madison 
his only lost election.) But there are other vicious arts. Demagoguery is 
one to which both the left and the right are susceptible. Surely electoral 
districts might surpass a population beyond which appeal to reason on 
a widespread scale becomes impracticable — a phenomenon that the 
pressure technology places on attention spans does not help. Even as 
they stretched on for hours, the Lincoln-Douglas debates drew popular 
crowds. It is hard to imagine such a scene occurring today.
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recoveriNg civic v irtue
The good that Federalist No. 10 seeks, again, is conditioning the appe-
tites of either majorities or minorities to the larger goals of the common 
good and private rights without violating the circumscribing principle 
of majority rule. If this good still commands our regard, as it should, 
the question is how to make the underlying assumptions of the essay 
compatible with the realities of contemporary political life.
Impossibilities can be dispensed with at the outset. There are no via-
ble, desirable, or constitutional means of controlling the pace or, worse, 
the content of political communication. Commentators such as Donald 
Livingston have questioned whether the republic is too large to cohere 
and consequently ought to be fractured into more uniform regional 
blocs, but such plans are neither feasible nor, for a variety of reasons, 
advisable. The United States is a single country whose citizens share 
traditions, memories, and obligations to one another and to the outside 
world arising from a common past and a present fraternity.
The Madisonian impulse is to look first for institutional solutions that 
can discipline interest groups. Constitutional mechanisms like judicial 
review, then, might be used to inhibit factions. But judicial review can 
be done well or poorly. And recall that, under the limiting conditions 
of Federalist No. 10, “the friend of popular governments” is searching 
for a solution to the problem of factions that does not “violat[e] the 
principles” — i.e., majority rule — “to which he is attached.” To this 
end, again, the essay achieves its result without relying on institutional 
mechanisms that ultimately inhibit majorities. It relies on speed bumps 
but not roadblocks, habituation rather than proscription. 
The empirical conditions not merely of an extensive republic but 
of 18th-century reality aided in Madison’s effort. The deliberate pace of 
communication did not require an institutional midwife. It was a fact 
of life. It need hardly be said that, 230 years after the essay’s November 
1787 publication, this condition no longer obtains. The question is what 
replaces it. 
The answer is that the converse of each assumption on which 
Federalist No. 10 relies is a restraining virtue. If Federalist No. 10 assumes 
at least consensus as to the existence of an objective morality, pure moral 
relativism must be challenged. If the immediate translation of prefer-
ences into policy is possible but detrimental, patience must intervene. 
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If positive government makes it possible to extract goods from others to 
feed oneself — thereby empowering minority factions — temperance is 
necessary. If technology has erased the constitutional distance between 
officeholders and constituents, self-restraint and deference may be re-
quired. If it has also shrunk attention spans to 140 characters, an ethic 
of public spiritedness will have to expand them.
What unites these is civic virtue, and thus the American regime 
must now get serious about its recovery. The idea that a pillar of the 
Madisonian order might now rest on civic virtue may seem acutely 
un-Madisonian. It was Madison, after all, who erected that theoreti-
cal system on the basis of “supplying . . . the defect of better motives.” 
Even within Federalist No. 10, he cautioned that “[e]nlightened 
statesmen will not always be at the helm.” But it is wrong to see 
Madison’s anthropology as Hobbesian; the Madisonian view of po-
litical man is not one of naked competition for “power after power, 
that ceaseth only in death.” If it had been, he would have been led to 
Hobbesian conclusions.
He arrived, instead, at republican ones. Indeed, even to say he “ar-
rived” at them overstates matters, for there is no evidence he ever gave a 
whiff of credence to any other possibilities. Madison recognized that an 
excessively bleak portrait of human nature naturally leads to despotism, 
not republicanism. He wrote in Federalist No. 55:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a 
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other 
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of es-
teem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the 
existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other 
form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the politi-
cal jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human 
character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient vir-
tue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than 
the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and 
devouring one another.
At Virginia’s ratifying convention, similarly, Madison noted the propen-
sity to assume either the worst or the best from politicians. He replied:
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But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will 
have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. 
Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched 
situation. No theoretical checks — no form of government can 
render us secure. To suppose that any form of government will 
secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a 
chimerical idea.
Madison recognizes what we have already seen. The demand for 
virtue among the people is relatively thin. They are not asked to ex-
ercise Ciceronian public spirit. Indeed, even in the contemporary 
context, we do not need to rely on virtue for the long-term suppres-
sion of the majoritarian tendency to abuse minorities. If citizens 
refrain from the impulses to abuse one another or to indulge their 
short-term appetites, the mechanics of Federalist No. 10 should have 
room to operate by allowing passions to dissipate and reason to iden-
tify long-term interest, including the genuine long-term interest in 
respecting the rights of others. That — and according public men the 
space to decide the details — is all the essay asks. This is, to be sure, 
no small request amid the temptations of technology and other social 
forces that encourage factious behavior. But neither is it a demand for 
supererogatory virtue.
Still, the traditional means of inculcating virtue — the family and 
institutions such as local schools — are themselves under pressure 
or subject to political capture. A national effort to instill civic virtue 
would almost certainly careen into the kind of politicization that has 
been witnessed in Education Department history standards and the 
like. Consequently, subsidiarity, the diffusion of authority to the most 
local possible level, would be vital to any effective effort to revive civic 
virtue. That is, it could not be uniform or imposed from on high. 
Political leaders could help in cultivating an awareness of its necessity, 
but not in dictating its precise terms.
On the other hand, it would be wrong to say that civic education is in-
herently ineffective, and still less that it has been ineffective in the American 
context. The constitutional “veneration” that Madison sought in Federalist 
No. 49 has largely been achieved. As far back as the 1830s, Tocqueville ob-
served the “irritable patriotism of the Americans,” according to which they 
could not bear to hear their political institutions criticized. 
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The success of civic education is nowhere clearer than in the argu-
ably distorting effect it has had in provoking what Mary Ann Glendon 
calls “rights talk,” the substitution of assertions of rights for persuasive 
argumentation about politics. Students as early as elementary school 
routinely learn the virtues of the Bill of Rights, in part because it is 
shorter and simpler to teach than the main body of the Constitution. 
This is, in a sense, a Madisonian success: Madison thought one pur-
pose of the Bill of Rights would be pedagogical, insofar as it would 
educate the people about their rights, even if he arguably would not 
have wanted that education to substitute for a holistic understanding 
of the regime. 
The point is that civic education can achieve constitutional ends. Of 
course, rights as contemporarily understood are entitlements; they sup-
ply us with something. Civic virtue, by contrast, demands something 
of us, and as such presents a more substantial political challenge.
Of these virtues, patience will surely be the hardest to restore. This 
is, to be clear, patience not as a private but rather as a civic virtue. The 
burden it places on citizens is not that they forgo dessert in favor of 
vegetables in their personal lives, but rather that they allow the regime 
the constitutional space to operate at its proper tempo. It asks that they 
consider issues in dimensions deeper than a tweet or, more precisely, 
that they demand that those they elect do so and thus do not expect 
their passions to be regularly fed.
Constitutionalism at its core depends on this civic patience, and 
Madison’s does in particular. Madison asks that republican citizens lash 
themselves to the mast as an exercise, not a surrender, of freedom. His 
system might be best described as one of quantum constitutionalism: 
Just as quantum physics speaks of the locations of particles in terms of 
probabilities, quantum constitutionalism cannot guarantee that major-
ity opinion will be heeded — or, for that matter, that minority rights 
will be protected — in any discrete instance. Rather, it generates greater 
and greater probabilities, growing with time, that the republican prin-
ciple and individual liberty will prevail. This constitutionalism cannot 
withstand a politics of instant gratification.
The restraint of appetites, too, is a considerable challenge. Rolling 
them backward is almost certainly impossible; November 1787, when 
Federalist No. 10 was published, is a distant and irrecoverable epoch. 
Perhaps the best that can be achieved here is refusing to allow the 
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positive state to reach further into the minutiae of economic life, gen-
erating more spaces for minority factions to hide. Civic education and 
political leadership that simply make citizens aware that one cost of 
economic micromanagement is breeding minority factions may help 
to clarify these choices.
As any reader of Lincoln’s Temperance Address knows, neither he-
roic self-restraint nor clobbering, moralistic education will succeed in 
inculcating such virtues as patience and moderation. A combined edu-
cational program is necessary, and politics in any modern sense can only 
account for part of it. 
The first part of this combination is moral virtue, which the ethic 
of subsidiarity teaches is likelier to come from the home than from 
school, and from life lessons than from textbooks. The second is a shift 
in civic education from the entitlement mentality of the Bill of Rights 
to the constitutional architecture of the overall regime, with the latter 
engendering an appreciation of the cadences and distances at which it 
is intended to function and the limited objects it is intended to attain. 
If the rights regime is a product of, or at least has been significantly 
shaped by, civic education, there is no reason that — steadily, with a 
patience appropriate to the subject matter — a new understanding can-
not be cultivated the same way.
Such a program, the construction of which must become a new imper-
ative of Madisonian political science, would serve an additional purpose: 
While Madison’s “mean extent” for a republic has, in the modern United 
States, far exceeded the scope possible for forming a public will with re-
spect to most particular issues, it may still be possible to form a coherent 
if thin understanding of the regime and, consequently, a defensive concert 
to safeguard it.
adjustiNg assuMptioNs
There is at least one clear sense in which a program of renewed civic 
virtue must be acknowledged to be in tension with Madisonian sup-
positions. While Madison assumes a people with sufficient virtue to 
be capable of self-government, he is at no point willing merely to rely 
on it. However, a recognition that virtue is more necessary now than 
it used to be — when empirical conditions imposed patience and dis-
tance — does not rely on virtue in any blind or total sense. It does not, 
for example, seek to replace the institutional mechanisms Madison 
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elucidates elsewhere with virtue. It simply recognizes that the particu-
lar assumptions of Federalist No. 10 no longer operate without added 
assistance. In other words, as Daniel Mahoney has argued, we must 
theorize the virtue that the founders could presuppose.
The issue, then, is not that civic virtue is all that is important to the 
Madisonian system; it is that civic virtue is more important than it used 
to be for one pillar of that system. This is an adjustment of Madisonian 
assumptions to contemporary political realities. Even if it does not pre-
cisely match Madison’s suppositions, such an adaptation of enduring 
principles to changing circumstances — one circumstance being that 
some of the suppositions of Federalist No. 10 no longer apply as they 
once did — certainly mimics his method.
